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ABSTRACT
Defeating Masquerade Detection
by Avani Kothari

A masquerader is an attacker who has obtained access to a legitimate user’s
computer and is pretending to be that user. The masquerader’s goal is to conduct an
attack while remaining undetected.
Hidden Markov models (HMM) are well-known machine learning techniques that
have been used successfully in a wide variety of fields, including speech recognition,
malware detection, and intrusion detection systems. Previous research has shown
that HMM trained on a user’s UNIX commands can provide an eﬀective means of
masquerade detection. Naı̈ve Bayes is a simple classifier based on Bayes Theorem,
which relies on the command frequency. In this project we empirically test various
masquerade mimicry strategies, that is, strategies for evading masquerade detection.
We develop and analyze four distinct masquerade mimicry strategies and in each
case, we give empirical results for their eﬀectiveness at evading Naı̈ve Bayes and
HMM-based masquerade detection.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction

A masquerader is an attacker who has obtained access to a legitimate user’s
computer and is pretending to be that user [26]. The masquerader’s goal is to conduct
an attack while remaining undetected. Detecting masquerade attacks is an important
challenge in the field of security.
In spite of eﬀorts to prevent intrusions [24], attackers with malicious intentions
often find a way to attack a system. We rely on Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to
detect such attacks. There are two broad categories of IDS, namely, signature-based
and anomaly-based. Signature-based IDS relies on attack patterns or signatures. In
contrast, anomaly-based detection relies on diﬀerences from expected behaviors of a
user or system.
The masquerade detection strategies considered here are based on anomaly detection. Specifically, we focus on user-issued UNIX Commands. In this paper, first
we consider two previously studied masquerade detection techniques; one technique
relies on Hidden Markov models (HMM) and the other is known as One-Class Naı̈ve
Bayes (OCNB).
Hidden Markov models are well-known machine learning techniques that have
been used successfully in a wide variety of applications, including speech recognition
[15], malware detection [27], and intrusion detection [8]. Research has shown that an
HMM that has been trained based on a users UNIX commands can be used as an
eﬀective means of masquerade detection [8]. One-Class Naı̈ve Bayes is a simple and
eﬃcient technique that has also been successfully applied to the masquerade detection
1

problem [26].
In this project, we consider several types of attacks, and we apply these attacks
to a particular data setthe Schonlau dataset [19]. This dataset has been used in
at least forty published papers focused on intrusion detection [15]. We empirically
analyze the eﬀect of each attack on both HMM-based and OCNB-based masquerade
detection.

2

CHAPTER 2
Background
2.1

Intrusion Detection Techniques
Intrusion detection is an essential security feature. This is because the violation

of security by an insider is the most dangerous attack in the field of security [10], as
the deployed security such as the firewalls and passwords will not detect the intrusion. According to Tavallaee, Stakhanova and Ghorbani in [27] intrusion detection is
defined as, a variety of techniques for detecting malicious and unauthorized activities
commonly known as attacks. Intrusion detection techniques are mainly classified into
two categories namely, signature-based and anomaly-based techniques. Signaturebased IDS relies on pre-defined signatures, whereas, anomaly-based IDS depends on
normal patterns, classifying a deviation from normal as an attack [27].

2.1.1

Signature-based Detection

In signature-based IDS, the signature refers to a byte sequence used to detect
malicious activities [22]. Signature-based IDS examine the incoming data for a pattern
of attack to match from the collection of attack signatures [6]. It is used to detect
known attacks. One of the most important advantages of a signature-based IDS is
that, no rigorous training is required that is knowledge of normal behavior is not
essential. Signature-based IDS are used by various commercial products, for example
malware detection and virus detection [6]. The predictability of this type of IDS is
very high, and the false positive or miss rate is very low, as signature-based IDS is
used to detect known attacks. Signature-based IDS are very simple and eﬃcient in
case of known signatures [24].
3

The biggest challenge in signature-based IDS is that every signature must have
an entry in the database of attack signatures. As each incoming sequence has to
be compared with each entry in the database, it slows down the system. Signaturebased IDS are vulnerable in case of unknown signatures, that is, if a new attack is
generated with a new signature, signature-based IDS will fail to detect the attack[22].
Signatures of newly developed attacks would have to be entered in the database in
order to be detected. As we know, attacks are developed at lightening pace; hence
the database of signature-based IDS needs to be updated often. We can conclude
that accuracy of signature-based IDS is high with no false positives when a signature
is known, but it does not perform well with unknown attacks.

2.1.2

Anomaly-based Detection

Anomaly-based IDS separates normal behavior from abnormal and attempts to
define a baseline or a profile behavior [24]. So, a suﬃciently large deviation from the
profile behavior is evidence of intrusion and the IDS provides a warning. In anomalybased IDS, abnormal is a synonym for an attack or intrusion [20]. An anomaly-based
IDS works on the assumption that the attack behavior significantly varies from normal
user behavior [13]. Therefore, it is comprised of two important steps: first, to profile
a normal behavior and second, to calculate the deviation from normal behavior.
Masquerade detection is a type of anomaly-based IDS. Anomaly-based IDS refer
to identifying pattern that does not fit normal behavior. Various techniques have
been used to develop anomaly-based IDS, for example statistical analysis-based [20],
Hidden Markov Model [8], Naı̈ve Bayes [26] and Support Vector Machine [10] to name
a few. These are a few conditions that make anomaly-based IDS diﬃcult to detect:
1. Defining normal behavior that includes all possible normal instances
4

2. Malicious actions adapting themselves to normal behavior to avoid getting detected
3. Adapting to evolving normal behavior
4. Obtaining suﬃcient training data so as to define normal behavior [2]
Anomaly-based IDS can detect a previously unknown attack.

We can say

anomaly-based IDS can thus, over come the disadvantage of signature-based IDS.

2.2

Masquerade Detection
A masquerade attack is an attack by a malicious user who has gained access to

a legitimate users credential and tries to impersonate the legitimate user. An IDS
used to detect this masquerade attack is called masquerade detection. We focus on
a UNIX command domain dataset in this project. Substantial work has been done
in this domain in the past few years. For masquerade detection in UNIX command
domain, various techniques have been developed to detect masquerade attacks. A
survey was conducted by Beracchini and Fierens in [1], to analyze all the techniques
used for masquerade detection in this domain. Below are several of the techniques
mentioned in [1].

1. Information Theoretic: This is a simple compression technique based on the assumption that, commands by user will tend to compress more than the intruders
commands. The results of this technique were disappointing [20].
2. Text Mining: This is a very popular technique. It detects repetitive sequence
by the user. The results are very accurate, but the computational cost is high
[3].
5

3. Hidden Markov Model Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a state machine [32]
based machine learning technique. HMM is trained using a legitimate users
data. The probability of transition from one state to another is provided. The
results are very good in case of HMM [8].
4. Naı̈ve Bayes Naı̈ve Bayes is a very simple and eﬃcient technique using a probability classifier. But in the UNIX command domain, the masquerade detection
could not perform substantially well [9]. As a result, a modified version known
as One-Class Naı̈ve Bayes (OCNB), was developed in [26] to obtain better results. The results obtained in [26] are exceptionally good.
5. Sequence and Bioinformatics Techniques based on sequence, generally used in
bioinformatics to identify a pattern, were applied in the UNIX command domain. The entire focus here is on sequence related information. The results were
unexpectedly inaccurate as compared to other masquerade detection techniques
[20].
6. Support Vector Machine Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a well-known machine learning technique that tends to separate data on separate planes. More
emphasis is given to eﬃciency as compared to Naı̈ve Bayes. The results in [31]
show that SVM outperforms the Naı̈ve Bayes approach.
7. Other Approaches A combination of two or more of the above methods was used
to develop several other hybrid approaches, but the results were unimpressive
[1].

We explain two of the most accurate masquerade detection techniques, Hidden
Markov Model and One-Class Naı̈ve Bayes in Sections 3 and 4, respectively.

6

In the foloowing section, we first explain the standard dataset used in masquerade
detection called the Schonlau Dataset [19]. We then explain in detail the basis to
judge a detection technique. Performance criteria are needed to compare eﬀectiveness,
accuracy and correctness of masquerade detection techniques.

2.2.1

Schonlau Dataset

The below Figure 1, is the pictorial view of Schonlau dataset [8].

Figure 1: Pictorial view of Schonlau Dataset [8]
Schonlau collected data of 50 users over a period of time. The Schonlau dataset
consists of 15000 UNIX commands for each user. Each block consists of 100 commands. First 5000 commands (50 blocks) of every user are assigned for training
purposes and the remaining 10000 commands (100 blocks) are assigned for testing.
Figure 2 below, is the pictorial view of the summary file.
Schonlau dataset also includes a map file. This map file consists of 0s and 1s
assigned for each block for the 50 users. This map file contains the summary of the

7

Figure 2: Masquerade locations [8]
attack. It consists of a 50 * 100 matrix where, 100 rows represent the 100 testing
blocks for each of the 50 users. 0 in the summary file indicates that the data of
the block belongs to the same user and it may not be contaminated by the attack
commands. A 1 in the summary file indicates the block is contaminated [19].

2.2.2

Performance Criteria

In anomaly-based IDS, first we train a model and set the threshold. Setting this
threshold is an essential process, as this threshold is eventually used to determine, if
the testing data is normal or anomalous. There are several terms and formula that
we will use in this paper, namely detection rate, false positive rate, and Receiver
Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve. These terms together comprise performance
criteria. We use these terms to compare diﬀerent masquerade detection techniques.
We first define all possible outcomes while performing masquerade detection below
in Figure 3.
A false positive (FP) occurs when; an IDS misclassifies non-attack data to be

8

Figure 3: The possible outcome diagram [16]
attack data. A true negative (TN) occurs when the IDS predicts non-attack data
to non-attack data. Similarly a true positive (TP) occurs when the IDS correctly
classifies an attack data to be attack data. And lastly, a false negative (FN) occurs
when the IDS classifies attack data to not attack data. To determine eﬀectiveness of
a masquerade detection technique we calculate detection rate and false positive rate
for the technique. The ideal masquerade detector should be able to detect all the
true positives and should not have any false positives. To compare two masquerade
detectors, their eﬀectiveness is measured by comparing their detection rate and false
positive rate.
False negative rate (FNR) and false positive rate (FPR) are used to plot the ROC

9

curve used to set the threshold. The formula of the TPR and FPR are as follows,

F NR =

FN
FN
=
P
TP + FN

(1)

FPR =

FP
FP
=
N
FP + FN

(2)

ROC curves are visual comparison between diﬀerent masquerade detection techniques applied on the same dataset [1]. The co-ordinates to plot ROC curves are
obtained by varying the thresholds, obtaining false positive and false negative at each
of these threshold values. ROC curves are used to display trade-oﬀ between missing
alarm rate (FNR) and false alarm rate (FPR). We can then measure Area Under the
Curve (AUC). Lesser the AUC better the eﬃciency of the technique.
If the threshold is set too high, true positive rate increases with increase in false
positive rate. On the contrary if the threshold is set too low, the false positive rate
decreases, but even the true positive rate decreases. So, we plot a graph between false
positive rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR) [21]. From the graph we select an
acceptable false positive rate. This type of graph is called an ROC curve and hence
we say, ROC curves are useful in setting an ideal threshold [8]. In this paper we
consider false positive rate of 0.05 as acceptable rate. So, in ROC curve we consider
the area before FPR 0.05 as useful. By plotting ROC curves for various masquerade
detection techniques applied on same dataset, we can compare them at FPR 0.05 for
better eﬃciency.
To empirically analyze and compare the performances of an intrusion detection
technique, their accuracy rates (ACR) are considered. Accuracy rate defines the
overall accuracy of the IDS. It can be defined as below,
10

ACR =

TP + TN
P +N

(3)

Detection rate is also known as true positive rate (TPR). Detection rate of an
IDS defines its correctness.

TPR =

TP
TP
=
P
TP + FN

(4)

Hence we calculate detection rate, accuracy rate and ROC curve for diﬀerent masquerade detection techniques on the same dataset while comparing and analyzing
performances of the techniques considered in this report.
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CHAPTER 3
Hidden Markov Model

The Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a machine-learning technique based on
Markov Chains. HMM is widely used in applications like speech recognition, virus
detection and malware detection. We use HMM to perform masquerade detection to
test its ability to detect the number of attacks successfully blocked. In this report we
compare HMM with a detection technique based on Bayes Theorem.

3.1

Introduction to HMM
Markov Chain is a stateless and memory less process. The transition from one

state to another state depends only on current state and transition probability matrix
[25]. HMM is a finite state model governed by a set of transition probabilities. With
each hidden state two probabilities are associated, one provides the probability of
transition to another state and second provides probability of being in the same state
[5]. Below in Figure 4, are few of the notations we use in HMM.

Figure 4: Notations for HMM [25]
12

In masquerade detection, the training data, i.e. the first 5000 commands of the
user is used to determine model of normalcy. The possible states would be self-user
block and masquerade block. The observation sequence would be the testing block
that we want to classify. HMM is defined by A, B and π. HMM model is represented
by λ = (A, B, π) as in [25].

Figure 5: Hidden Markov Process [25]
The Markov Chain is hidden behind the dashed line in the Figure 5 above. The
Markov process is determined by the A matrix and the current state. The observations
are determined by the Markov process related to the hidden states with the help of
matrix B.

3.2

Implementation
Below are the three problems, which can HMM solve eﬃciently.
Problem 1: Given a model λ = (A, B, π), HMM can obtain scores for the

observation sequences to determine their similarity to the model by calculating P (O |
λ). This determines how well the observation fit the model [25].
Problem 2: Given a model λ = (A, B, π) and Observation O, HMM can determine
the hidden optimal sequence [25].
Problem 3: Given O, N, and M, HMM can train a model to fit the observation
13

by determining the model λ so as to obtain maximum probability of O [25].
In the masquerade detection domain, we are concerned about problems 1 and 3.
We first train the model with the training data that is first 5000 commands. We do
this using the problem 3 above. After training the model, we then use problem 1 to
obtain scores for the testing blocks P (O | λ), to determine their similarity with the
model. A high probability score indicates greater resemblance between the test block
and the training block and would be classified as a self-user block. A low probability
block would indicate diﬀerences between training data and testing block and this
block would be classified as an attack block.

14

CHAPTER 4
One-Class Naı̈ve Bayes
4.1

Introduction to Naı̈ve Bayes
One-Class Naı̈ve Bayes (OCNB) in the domain of masquerade detection is based

on Bayes Theorem. Naı̈ve Bayes (NB) classifiers are a supervised learning technique.
They are very simple to implement and understand and more often than not give
eﬃcient results [7]. Bayes theorem gives a rule for conditional probability. Conditional
probability is probability of event A occurring if event B occurs. In masquerade
detection we use Naı̈ve Bayes classification to determine the probability of a block
of 100 commands belonging to a user. For example, to estimate that an instance of
x = {x1 , x2 , x3 , . . . , xn } belongs to class y as,
m

P (y | x) =

P (y)
P (y) �
P (x | y) =
P (xi | y)
P (x)
P (x) i=1

(5)

In the next section we discuss in detail how Naı̈ve Bayes Classification helps in
masquerade detection in UNIX commands domain.

4.2

Implementation
NB has been used in context of masquerade detection in [26] mainly using Schon-

lau Dataset. Schonlau Dataset consists of 15,000 commands (150 blocks) for each user
out of which first 5000 (50 blocks) commands are used for training and the remaining
10000 (100 blocks) commands are used for testing.
Let [c1 , c2 , . . . , cm ] where ci is the (i)th unique command in the block B. This
vector consists of names of all the commands appearing in the block B at least once
15

and m is number of unique commands in block B. Every block B to be classified is
then represented into a vector of attribute [n1 (B), n2 (B), . . . , nm (B)] where ni (B) is
number of times command ci appears in the block B. Then we can compute P (y | B)
as follows [26],

P (y | B) = P (y)

m
�
i=1

P (ci | y)ni (B)

(6)

The probabilities of P (ci | y) for every command can be calculated from the
training data (first 5000 commands). To normalize the probability on occurrence of
new commands and to obtain non-zero probability we add the smoothing factor while
calculating P (ci | y). P(y) and P(x) can be ignored as they are constants and will
remain the same for all the commands. The final P (ci | y) [26] can be given by,

P (ci | y) =

�

ni (B) + α

B∈T (y)

| B | · | T (y) | +α · m

(7)

Where, α is the smoothing factor and T(y) is the training set for class y. We
calculate the score for each block to classify the block as a user block or a non-user
block. The score for every block is calculated as follows,

score(B) = − log P (y | B) = −

m
�
i=1

ni (B) log P (ci | y)

(8)

The anomaly of the block is directly proportional to the score [26]. If a block
has very less score it has probability to be a users block. We set the threshold to be
a score, which gives us the acceptable false positive rate and detection rate.
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CHAPTER 5
Evading Masquerade Detection
For any masquerade detection technique, both eﬃciency and accuracy are its
most important features. In this project we try to attack two of the best-known
masquerade detection techniques called HMM and OCNB to test their strengths and
determine their weaknesses. In this process, we have developed four unique attacks
namely,
1. Scattered Attack
2. Scattered Sorted Attack
3. Consecutive Attack
4. Consecutive Random User Attack
These attacks are generated on a block of 100 commands. In Scattered Attack,
the attacks commands are scattered randomly throughout the block. Whereas, for
Scattered Sorted Attack, the attack blocks are scattered but in a sorted manner. In
Consecutive Attack, the attack commands are placed consecutively. But in case of
Consecutive Random User Attack, the attack commands are obtained from random
users and then placed in a consecutive manner. We explain each of these attacks in
this section and then empirically analyze compare their results.
All the four attacks are randomized and non-poisoned. Below are a few notations
and basic concepts that we will be using while generating the attacks.
A = attack
17

P = padding
| | = Denotes length of the sequence
B = block in which attack is being generated
| B | be the block length = 100
So, we have
| B |=| A | + | P |

(9)

In a block of 100 commands, we if we have |A| attack commands, we have 100-|A|
as padding commands.
While generating the attack we always maintain |A| ≤ |B|. These three unique
attacks diﬀer in positions and attack commands. Below we explain each of these
attacks in detail.

5.1

Scattered Attack

5.1.1

Discussion

We generate this attack for |A| from 10, 20, 30,. . .,100 for each of the 50 Users.
This attack is called a scattered attack because the attack commands are scattered
throughout the block. We select random |A| positions in the block to insert the
attack. The attack commands are chosen randomly from the random users training
data. We use training data because we do not intend to generate a poisonous attack.
Below is the algorithm to generate Scattered Attack.
Algorithm:
For every user:
1. Obtain random |A| numbers between 1 to 100
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2. Get a random user except the current user say randUser
3. Get |A| commands from a random starting point in randUser’ss training data
4. Insert these |A| commands from randUser in the random positions generated in
step 1
5. Pad the rest of the block with self user commands
In the above algorithm, |A| is the attack length. Below Figure 6, is the example
of Scattered Attack:

Figure 6: Example of Scattered Attack of |A| = 10
The above block in Figure 6 is an example of block of a 100 commands. The
10 highlighted commands are the attack commands inserted into the block. These
attack commands are obtained from training data of some randomly selected user.
We then generate a summary file to keep a track of the blocks in which attack is
inserted. We then test the attack with both of the masquerade detection techniques
based on HMM and OCNB.
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5.1.2

Experimental Results

The attack generated by the above algorithm is tested with HMM and OCNB.
The results of these detection techniques are explained below in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Detection Rate of Scattered Attack for HMM and OCNB
The graphs in Figure 7, is the detection rate obtained for one of the User when
tested for Scattered Attack with both HMM and OCNB. In Figure 7 we can clearly
see that up to length 70, both HMM and OCNB have almost the same detection rate,
but as the attack length increases further, the detection rate of HMM is more than
OCNB. So we can say that, HMM can detect Scattered Attack very eﬃciently beyond
attack length of 70.
In the Figures 8, 9, 10 and 11 below, we show examples of Scattered Attack
with attack length 10 and 50, tested with HMM and OCNB for one of the User.
As we see in these figures, scores of each of the 100 blocks in the testing data are
plotted. The self-user blocks are in blue color, whereas the attack blocks are red in
color. The threshold diﬀerentiates the attack data from self-user data. In case of
20

HMM, the scores are negative so the attack data area would be below the threshold
line. Whereas, in OCNB, the scores are positive, so the attack blocks are above the
threshold line. In these examples the false positive rate is tuned to 0.05.
For this example, the detection rate for attack length 10 with HMM is 0.1. We
can see in the Figure 8, the attack blocks are camouflaged in the self-user area above
the threshold line. In Figure 9, the detection rate for attack length 50 with HMM
is 0.7; we can observe that most of the attack blocks are correctly classified. In
Figure 10, the scores for all the testing blocks of scattered attack of length 10 tested
with OCNB are shown. We can clearly observe that most of attack blocks have
similar scores are self-user blocks, thus they lie below the threshold line. In fig 11, we
analyze the Scattered Attack of length 50 tested with OCNB. The detection rate of
this example was found to be 0.7.

Figure 8: Scores by HMM for Scattered Attack of length 10
We then plot ROC curves by generating false positives and false negative for each
of the masquerade detection technique. ROC curve is a visual comparison between
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Figure 9: Scores by HMM for Scattered Attack of length 50

Figure 10: Scores by OCNB for Scattered Attack of length 10
HMM and OCNB. We will consider a technique to be better than other, if the threshold cuts the curve at lower rate of false negative. In Figure 12 we can clearly see the
for attack length 10, HMMs performance is better than OCNB. Whereas in Figure
13, we compare an example with attack length 50, we can see that at the threshold
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Figure 11: Scores by OCNB for Scattered Attack of length 50
mark, both HMM and OCNB intersect with threshold at same point thus we can say
both perform equally for SA, |A| = 50.

Figure 12: ROC curve for SA, |A| = 10
In Figure 14 we can observe the ROC curves plotted, we detect that, OCNB is
more eﬃcient than HMM when |A| = 100. In Figure 15 we compare ROC curves for
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Figure 13: ROC curve for SA, |A| = 50
SA of |A| = 10, 50 and 100 with both HMM and OCNB. We conclude that eﬃciency
of both the masquerade detection technique increases with increase in |A|, as the area
under the curve gradually decreases.

Figure 14: ROC curve for SA, |A| = 100
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Figure 15: ROC curve for SA
We observe, for the considered example of SA, the detection rate of OCNB is
better for attack lengths less than 20, but beyond attack length 20 HMM performs
better than OCNB.

5.2

Scattered Sorted Attack

5.2.1

Discussion

Scattered Sorted Attack (SSA) is a similar attack to Scattered Attack but with
a modification. In SSA, the attack commands are inserted in a random and scattered
manner, but in ascending order of position. That is, we first randomly select the
positions and sort them, and then insert the attack commands. We perform this
attack for 50 Users and attack length varying from 10, 20, 30,. . .,100.
In SSA, we first randomly select |A| positions then we then sort these positions.
After sorting the positions we insert attack commands in these positions.
Algorithm:
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For every user:
1. Obtain random |A| numbers between 1 to 100
2. Sort these |A| positions in ascending order
3. Get a random user except the current user say randUser
4. Get |A| commands from a random starting point in randUser’ss training data
5. Insert these |A| commands from randUser in the random positions generated in
step 1
6. Pad the rest of the block with self user commands
Figure 16 below is an example of Scattered Sorted Attack.
In the Figure 16, we can observe, random positions are selected in a block of
100 commands, these positions are in random order. The positions are then sorted;
the attack commands are then inserted at these positions. The intuition behind this
attack is that when the attack length is 100, the attack will be in consecutive manner.

5.2.2

Experimental Results

After generating the attack, we test it with both HMM and OCNB. In Figure
17, the detection rate for both HMM and OCNB is plotted for a user. We can clearly
observe OCNB performs better when attack is less, but as attack length increases the
detection rate for SSA is more in case of OCNB. HMM performs better for attack
lengths 30, 40, 50 and 70 for this example.
We then plot ROC curves to determine better masquerade detection technique.
The ROC curve in Figure 18, is for attack length 10, we can say that OCNB performs
26

Figure 16: Example of Scattered Sorted Attack of |A| = 10

Figure 17: Detection Rate of SSA with HMM and OCNB
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better. We also observe ROC curves for attack length 50 and 100 respectively in
Figures 19 and 20. By examining these curves, we can conclude that OCNB performs
better than HMM for this example of SSA.

Figure 18: ROC curve for SSA, |A| = 10

Figure 19: ROC curve for SSA, |A| = 50
It can be clearly observed that the threshold intersects the ROC curve of OCNB
28

Figure 20: ROC curve for SSA, |A| = 100
at lower false negative rate in all the above cases and also the area covered by OCNBs
ROC curve is less than that of HMM. Thus we can say for this example OCNB
performs better than HMM.

5.3

Consecutive Attack

5.3.1

Discussion

Consecutive Attack is also a random attack. In Consecutive Attack, the attack
commands are inserted in a consecutive order in the attack block. The attack commands are obtained from a randomly selected users training data. After inserting
the attack commands, the block is padded with self-user commands. We generate
this attack for all the 50 users with attack lengths 10, 20, 30,. . .,100. Below is the
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algorithm for Consecutive Attack.
Algorithm:
For every user:
1. Get a random starting point in the block say strpt such that (strpt + |A|) ≤ 100
2. Obtain a random User say randUser from 1 to 50 except current user and a
random point between 1 to (5000-|A|) say rdpt
3. Get consecutive |A| commands from randUser starting from rdpt
4. Insert these |A| commands from strpt in consecutive manner
5. Pad the rest of the block with self-commands.
Figure 22 below, is an example of Consecutive Attack of attack length (|A|) is
10. The highlighted commands are the attack commands and the non-highlighted
ones are the padding commands.

Figure 21: Example of Consecutive Attack of |A| = 10
Consecutive Attack is then tested with both HMM and OCNB. The results are
given in the next section.
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5.3.2

Experimental Results

Below is an example of CA, where it has been tested with HMM and OCNB.
In Figure 23, the bar graphs represent detection rate. For attack length 10 to 60 we
can clearly observe that OCNB, has a better detection rate than HMM. But, for this
example we can see that the detection rate of attack length 70 and 80 are slightly
better for HMM. Again for attack length 90 and 100, the detection rate for OCNB
is better. More examples of scores of each block of Consecutive Attacks with both
HMM and OCNB are placed in the Appendix.

Figure 22: Detection Rate of Consecutive Attack for HMM and OCNB
Below in Figures 24, 25 and 26 we display ROC curve for examples of CA tested
with HMM and OCNB for attack lengths 10, 50 and 100 respectively. We can observe
from these ROC curves that the eﬃciency for HMM and OCNB is almost the same
for this examples.
We can conclude that detection rate for OCNB-based masquerade detection technique is better than HMM-based masquerade detection technique for the above example in case of Consecutive Attack from Figure 23.
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Figure 23: ROC curve for CA, |A| = 10

Figure 24: ROC curve for CA, |A| = 50
5.4

Consecutive Random User Attack

5.4.1

Discussion

Consecutive Random User Attack (CRUA) is similar to the Consecutive Attack
(CA). In this attack, the attack commands are placed in a consecutive manner as in
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Figure 25: ROC curve for CA, |A| = 100

Figure 26: ROC curve for CA
Consecutive Attack. But the procedure to obtain the attack commands is diﬀerent.
In Consecutive Random User Attack, all the attack commands are obtained from
all distinct users. In this attack, we want all the attack commands from diﬀerent
users. We first obtain attack commands from |A| diﬀerent users and insert them
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consecutively in a block. After inserting the attack commands we pad the rest of the
block with self-user commands. Below is the algorithm for Consecutive Random User
Attack.
Algorithm:
For every user:
1. Select a random position say rdpt in the attack block, such that rdpt + |A| ≤100
2. Obtain |A| random commands one from each of |A| random users
3. Insert these commands in the attack block starting at rdpt in a consecutive
manner
4. Pad the rest of the block of self commands
The Figure 28 below is an example of Consecutive Random User Attack with
attack length 10, where the highlighted commands are the attack commands. These
10 attack commands are obtained from 10 diﬀerent users selected randomly. The
attack commands are then inserted in the block in a consecutive manner. The nonhighlighted commands are the padding commands.

5.4.2

Experimental Results

We then test the Consecutive Random User Attack with both HMM and OCNB.
The graph in Figure 29 shows the detection rate of attack blocks for a user. We can see
the detection rate increases with increase in attack length in both the masquerade
detection techniques namely, HMM and OCNB. But HMM performs better than
OCNB in this example. At attack length 10, the detection rate for HMM and OCNB
is about 20% but for attack length 50, detection rate for HMM is about 50% and the
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Figure 27: Example of Consecutive Random User Attack of |A| = 10
OCNB detection rate is about 40%. HMM could detect more than 50% of the attack
blocks beyond attack length 50 but in case of OCNB, more than 50% of the attack
blocks are detected for attack length more than 60. The examples of Consecutive
Random User Attack can be found in the Appendix.

Figure 28: Detection Rate of CRUA with HMM and OCNB
The Figures below 30, 31, 32 and 33 are the ROC curves plotted by HMM and
OCNB when tested with CRUA.
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Figure 29: ROC curve for CRUA, |A| = 10

Figure 30: ROC curve for CRUA, |A| = 50
In Figure 30, 31 and 32 we plot the ROC curve for a user. We observe that
HMM performs better in CRUA. Thus we conclude for this example, HMM is more
eﬃcient than OCNB for Consecutive Random User Attack.
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Figure 31: ROC curve for CRUA, |A| = 100

Figure 32: ROC curve for CRUA
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CHAPTER 6
Analysis of Attacks

In this section we compare and analyze the results of the four attacks with both
the masquerade detections based on HMM and OCNB. We do this by calculating
their detection rates and accuracy rates.
For comparing the above generated four attacks, we perform a few experiments.
We generate ten attacks of each of the four types. For each attack, we generate
datasets of attack lengths varying from 10, 20, 30,. . .,100. We do this for all the 50
Users. Then each of these attacks are tested with both the masquerade detection
techniques namely HMM and OCNB. We then calculate detection rate and accuracy rate for each of these attacks. Detection rate illustrates how well the detection
technique identifies the attack data and the accuracy signifies how well the detection
technique identifies both attack blocks as well as self-user blocks. While obtaining
accuracy rate and detection rate we keep the false positive rate to be 0.05 that is 5%.
In the Table 1 below, we can generate the averaged detection of all the four
attacks named Scattered Attack (SA), Scattered Sorted Attack (SSA), Consecutive
Attack (CA) and Consecutive Random User Attack (CRUA) tested with Hidden
Markov Model (HMM) and One-Class Naı̈ve Bayes (OCNB). Detection rates for
attack lengths 10, 20, 30,. . .,100 are shown below.
Below Table 2, displays the average accuracy rate of all the experiments mentioned above.
In Figures 34, 35, 36 and 37 we plot curves of detection rate and accuracy rates
from above generated results to compare HMM and OCNB for each of the attacks.
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Table 1: Average of Detection Rate for the four attacks with HMM and OCNB

|A|
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

SA
HMM OCNB
0.20735 0.21645
0.25862 0.29319
0.33835 0.34528
0.42428 0.40199
0.48489 0.45805
0.52894 0.49541
0.55584 0.53503
0.58277 0.56846
0.60756 0.59376
0.62855 0.6220

SSA
HMM OCNB
0.18798 0.21309
0.25278 0.28726
0.3314 0.35196
0.37697 0.40170
0.42813 0.43830
0.47876 0.49336
0.52267 0.53070
0.53311 0.56765
0.55255 0.58969
0.56324 0.62814

CA
HMM OCNB
0.18153 0.22012
0.22666 0.29436
0.27824 0.36401
0.32671 0.4054
0.37496 0.44230
0.43679 0.49745
0.46761 0.53924
0.49919 0.55767
0.54613 0.6140
0.58426 0.62808

CRUA
HMM OCNB
0.10937 0.18321
0.12185 0.24999
0.1315 0.30495
0.15428 0.35917
0.17514 0.40572
0.19291 0.44007
0.21771 0.47777
0.24024 0.50899
0.24834 0.53682
0.26154 0.56136

Table 2: Average of Accuracy Rate for the four attacks with HMM and OCNB

|A|
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

SA
HMM OCNB
0.8549 0.85002
0.86118 0.85882
0.8725 0.86506
0.88156 0.87226
0.88788 0.87926
0.8926
0.884
0.89658
0.889
0.90092 0.89298
0.90396 0.89642
0.90638 0.89984

SSA
HMM OCNB
0.85356 0.85696
0.86124 0.86612
0.87128 0.87592
0.8774 0.8822
0.88468 0.88744
0.88976 0.89248
0.8952 0.89792
0.89692 0.90116
0.89856 0.90792
0.89932 0.91208

CA
HMM OCNB
0.85272 0.85032
0.85812 0.85912
0.86504 0.86752
0.87028 0.87244
0.8772 0.87776
0.88456 0.88428
0.88812 0.88916
0.89216 0.89132
0.89788 0.89916
0.90248 0.90088

CRUA
HMM OCNB
0.83564 0.8723
0.84102 0.8844
0.84474
0.896
0.84802 0.90264
0.8505 0.90874
0.85398 0.91222
0.8592 0.91632
0.86144 0.91908
0.86112 0.92178
0.86146 0.9227

In Figure 34 we can see that the detection rate for Scattered Attack is initially higher
for OCNB but with increase in attack length the detection rate is greater for HMM.
Whereas the accuracy rate for HMM and OCNB is almost same. So we can say that
HMM outperforms OCNB in SA.
In Figure 35, we plot detection rate and accuracy rate curves for SSA tested with
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Figure 33: Comparison between HMM and OCNB for Scattered Attack
HMM and OCNB. We view that detection rates for OCNB are higher than HMM for
all the attack lengths. The accuracy is more or less same for both HMM and OCNB.
We can thus, conclude OCNB outperforms HMM in case of SSA.

Figure 34: Comparison between HMM and OCNB for Scattered Sorted Attack
In Figure 36, below we can see results of Consecutive Attack tested with both
HMM and OCNB. The detection rate and accuracy rate for OCNB is higher for all
attacks lengths as compared to HMM. OCNB performs better than HMM in case of
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Consecutive Attack.

Figure 35: Comparison between HMM and OCNB for Consecutive Attack
In Figure 37 below, the results of Consecutive Random User Attack are shown
graphically. The detection rate for HMM is better than OCNB for all the attack
lengths. But the accuracy rate remains more or less the same for both HMM and
OCNB.

Figure 36: Comparison between HMM and OCNB for Consecutive Random User
Attack
Thus from the Figures 34, 35, 36 and 37 we conclude, HMM performs better in
case of Scattered Attack (SA) and Consecutive Random User Attack (CRUA) but
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OCNB performs better in Scattered Sorted Attack (SSA) and Consecutive Attack
(CA).
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion
A masquerade detection technique identifies the masquerader.

In a UNIX

command-based domain, a masquerade detection technique identifies attack blocks
and diﬀerentiates them with the self-blocks. In this report we generated four distinct
attacks and compared their results with two very well known masquerade detection
techniques. The four attacks generated namely Scattered Attack, Scattered Sorted
Attack, Consecutive Attack and Consecutive Random User Attack. We tested these
four attacks with two well-known masquerade detection techniques, Hidden Markov
Model and One-Class Naı̈ve Bayes. The detection rates and accuracy rates were
generated for each attack by setting the false positive to 0.05.
Scattered Attack can successfully evade Hidden Markov Model-based masquerade
detection technique for attack length 10 to 50 attack commands, whereas Scattered
Attack can evade One-Class Naı̈ve Bayes up to 60 attack commands. As attack
length increases the detection rate and accuracy rate for both masquerade detection
techniques based on Hidden Markov Models and One-Class Naı̈ve Bayes gradually
increases. But, Hidden Markov Model-based masquerade detection technique outperforms One-Class Naı̈ve Bayes. In case of Scattered Sorted Attack, it can evade both
HMM-based masquerade detection and One-Class Naı̈ve Bayes till attack length of
60 commands are inserted in the block, beyond attack length of 60 commands both
these techniques were able to detect more than 50 percentage of the attack blocks,
but One-Class Naı̈ve Bayes performs better. Whereas, Consecutive Attack can successfully evade HMM-based masquerade detection even when we insert 80 percentage
of the block with attack commands and One-Class Naı̈ve Bayes with 60 percentage of
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attack commands. One-Class Naı̈ve Bayes performs better in detecting Consecutive
Attack. On the contrary in case of Consecutive Random User Attack, HMM detects
better One-Class Naı̈ve Bayes and Consecutive Random User Attack can evade up
to attack length of 60 attack commands in Hidden Markov Model-based masquerade
detection technique and 70 attack commands in case of One-Class Naı̈ve Bayes.
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CHAPTER 8
Future Work

We would like to analyze and gain knowledge about additional machine learning
techniques to test with these attacks. In the future, we would like to develop a new
and eﬃcient masquerade detection algorithm by using salient features of all the preexisting techniques. We would also like to research more in the field of masquerade
detection and develop a technique that could not only detect masquerade attack, but
also eﬃciently separate attack commands and padding commands.
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APPENDIX
Appendix
A.1

Additional Results
The Figures 38, 39, 40 and 41 shows scores of HMM and OCNB when applied

to CA with |A| of 10 and 50 respectively.

Figure A.37: Scores by HMM for Consecutive Attack of length 10 for User 45

Figure A.38: Scores by HMM for Consecutive Attack of length 50 for User 45
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Figure A.39: Scores by OCNB for Consecutive Attack of length 10 for User 45

Figure A.40: Scores by OCNB for Consecutive Attack of length 50 for User 45
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